



with a Russian Party
Among emerging markets in 1996 Russia was rated the riskiest country for
foreign investment and was among the countries of the former Soviet Union that
were considered to be the greatest credit risk.' While the economic outlook for
Russia has improved,2 the current state of Russian society and economy continues
to provide a deterrent to potential investors interested in breaking into the Russian
market, as well as to current investors that may be considering expanding their
Note: The American Bar Association grants permission to reproduce this article, or a part thereof,
in any not-for-profit publication or handout provided such material acknowledges original publication
in this issue of The International Lawyer and includes the title of the article and the name of the
author.
*J.D. Candidate 1998, Southern Methodist University School of Law; Comments Editor, Southern
Methodist School of Law; Editorial Board, The International Lawyer and The International Law
Review Association. Author would like to give special thanks to Adrian Moore of Baker & McKenzie,
Moscow, for his assistance in obtaining research material.
1. Results for the third quarter of 1996 placed Russia at the top of country risk ratings and
listed the former Soviet Union as the largest credit risk, based on economic and political factors;
see THE EcONOMIST, Sept. 7, 1996, at 100. Countries considered less risky than Russia include
Mexico, Turkey, China, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Poland, Czech Republic, and Chile. See id. In
1998 the People's Republic of China remains preferable to Russia for foreign investment. See Freder-
ick M. Abbott, Foundation-Building for Western Hemispheric Integration, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 900, 913.
2. See John Thornhill, Russian Bulls Thunder Ahead, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1997. "Russia stands
at the start of an economic upswing... I Id. at 34 (stating that the Russian economy is turning,
interest rates have drastically fallen, and industrial production grew 3 % in August); Clifford German,
Looking for the Gold Fields of Eastern Europe, THE INDEP., Oct. 11, 1997, at 4 ("Inflation is coming
down, public sector deficits are coming under control and output is recovering.").
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involvement in Russia.3 The current state of Russia's legal environment is an
integral part of that deterrence, including concerns about the availability of impar-
tial arbitration of disputes.4 However, there have been some recent changes in
the organization of Russian courts and in Russian rules governing international
arbitration that have brought some improvements in the Russian legal climate.5
This comment provides guidance for parties to a Russian contract in deciding
what forum to choose when drafting an arbitration clause for submitting their
dispute to arbitration. This comment first examines the new system of Russian
Arbitrazh Courts as an alternate forum for the resolution of international business
disputes. The comment then focuses on three main international arbitration fora,
namely the International Commercial Arbitration Court in the Russian Chamber
of Commerce and Industry, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Arbitration
Institute, and the International Chamber of Commerce Court of International
Arbitration (Paris).
I. Problems Facing the Russian Legal System
Before discussing aspects of international arbitration in context, it is necessary
to understand the types of problems facing the Russian legal system in general.
As Ilya Nikiforov notes in Legal Research in Russian Law, "[w]hen talking about
[sic] Russian legal system it is necessary to describe not only the theory, but
also actual enforcement of existing laws. Otherwise, the idealized description
3. See John Thornhill, Playing the Waiting Game, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1997, at 8 (stating that
political uncertainties are still the greatest deterrent for foreign investors; three big obstacles to
operating in Russia remain: tax, bureaucracy, and crime and corruption); Russia-US Investment
Environment, Russia Express-Perestroika: Executive Briefing, April 24, 1995 available in 1995 WL
7947489; John Barton & Simone Shaheen, Sharing the Wealth: The Role for Venture Capitalists in
Russia's Economic Development, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 33, 33 (1995); John Thornhill,
Flexibility Urged on Energy, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1994, available in 1994 WL 12631446 (stating
that development projects with foreign companies will not be realized unless the investment climate
becomes more predictable and stable); John Thornhill, Investors Look for Russian Climate Change:
Prospects for Cutting Through the Bureaucracy, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1994, at 2 [hereinafter
Thornhill, Investors Look].
4. Using courts remains difficult for settling disputes in a civilized way. See Paul E. Tatum
& Kira Nicole Todd, Don't Get Caught in a Contract Dispute in Russia, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct.
7, 1996, at 12. Some international companies involved in energy projects in the past postponed their
projects (worth billions of dollars for Russia's oil field development) in Russia waiting to see the final
version of production-sharing legislation, particularly provisions providing for impartial arbitration of
disputes. See Robert Corzine, Sakhalin I Oil Project to Begin, FIN. TIMES, June 11, 1996, at 3.
One of many deterrents to foreign investors is that "the legislative climate can change overnight
with little possibility of international arbitration." Thornhill, Investors Look, supra note 3, at 2.
5. See Alan J. Koman, Arbitrating Among the Russians? Sixteen Issues a Western Party Must
Consider Before Entering into Arbitration Proceedings, 42 FED. LAW. 26, 33 (1995); Steven Keeva,
Ceeli Honors Slovak Leader, Michal Kovac Thanks U.S. Lawyersfor Aiding His Country, 81 A.B.A.
J. 109, 109 (1995) (quoting Steven Walther, chair of the ABA Standing Committee on World Order
Under Law, on the positive role of the Arbitration Courts).
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may mislead [people]." 6 He then provides a short summary of the problems
facing the Russian legal system: often rules emerge as a result of economic
necessity rather than law; lack of tradition of law-making; political instability;
corruption and bribery; people's unwillingness to use the law; and lack of state
bodies' adherence to the law. 7 Nikiforov suggests that a possible answer to these
problems involves more lawyers and more reliance upon the law.' Another com-
mentator's suggestion for foreign businessmen dealing with Russian partners is
to "demand arbitration clauses in your contracts and find a very good lawyer. "9
Specific problems having an impact on arbitration are discussed below.
II. The Russian Arbitrazh Courts
In the past, arbitration (in the nonjudicial sense) among parties to a Russian
contract was the standard method for resolution of economic disputes in foreign
trade, and the traditional forum for such arbitration was the International Commer-
cial Arbitration Court (ICAC) under the Russian Federation Chamber of Com-
merce and Industry (CCI). 10 However, in response to economic, legislative, and
constitutional reforms in the early 1990s, in 1995 Russia enacted new laws funda-
mentally revising and superseding analogous statutes passed in 1991 and 1992,
creating the Arbitrazh (Arbitration) Courts."l These courts are specially designed
to deal with economic disputes, and are separate from the Constitutional Courts
and Courts of General Jurisdiction (civil courts). 12 Despite their name, they are
state judicial bodies and their purpose is to "adjudicate, not arbitrate, economic
disputes between [businesses]."' 3
Some of the changes made include a three-tier structure replacing a two-tier
structure, an appellate process for judicial acts, statutory structure and powers
6. Ilya Nikiforov, Legal Research In Russian Law, Russian Legal Server-Tutorial on Russian
Legal Research (visited Oct. 20, 1997) <http://solar.rtd.utk.edu/-sanor/research/tutorial.html>,
at page 2. See also Simon G. Zinger, Comment, Navigating the Russian Shipping Industry: Making
the Most of the International and Russian Law for Successful Arbitration Against Russian Parties,
8 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 141, 175 (1995) (stating that legal procedures do not resemble the procedures
described by Russian legislation or international conventions).
7. Nikiforov, supra note 6, at 2.
8. Id. at 3.
9. Kira Nicole Todd & Paul E. Tatum, Best Be Wary of Joint Ventures in Russia, WALL ST.
J. EUR., Aug. 25, 1995, at 6.
10. See Zinger, supra note 6, at 159.
11. Law on Arbitrazh Courts, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1995, No. 1-FKZ; Arbitrazh Procedural
Code, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1995 No. 70-FZ. See also Russia Overhauls System ofArbitration Courts,
6 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION Rep. 173, 174 (1995) [hereinafter Russia Overhauls System]; Glenn
P. Hendrix, Business Litigation and Arbitration in Russia, 31 INT'L LAW. 1075 (1997); Arbitrazh
Law, Commentary and Consultation, ZAKONOD. I EKON., No. 19-20 (113-114)/95, at 54 [Hereinafter
Commentary].
12. See Russia Overhauls System, supra note 11, at 174.
13. Id. To avoid confusion, these courts will be referred to as the Russian Arbitrazh Courts,
rather than arbitration courts.
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for each Arbitrazh Court, and a more detailed procedural code. 14 The Arbitrazh
Courts consist of: (1) The High Arbitrazh Court; (2) Federal Arbitrazh Courts;
and (3) Arbitrazh Courts of the republics, territories, regions, Federal-importance
cities, autonomous regions, and autonomous areas (referred to as arbitrazh courts
of the subjects of the RF).' 5 Personal jurisdiction in the Arbitrazh Courts is
obtained through actions taken by entrepreneurs, companies, and other legal
entities and public authorities, while subject matter jurisdiction generally covers
disputes arising out of economic contracts or property relationships. 16 Parties
(including foreigners) to a dispute may refer the matter to private arbitration.' 7
A. POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE ARBITRAZH COURTS
One commentator has said that the Arbitrazh Court "is one of the most im-
portant institutions in Russia's transformation from a command economy to a
market economy. . . . [stating that] [n]ow, foreign investors can have confidence
that commercial disputes can be arbitrated fairly." " One source of such optimism
may be the laws creating (and later amending) the Arbitrazh Courts. The Arbitrazh
Procedural Code (the Procedural Code) governs the Arbitrazh Courts' procedural
methods and provides mechanisms to help ensure the fair adjudication of dis-
putes.' 9 The Procedural Code also contains articles that, on their face, provide
for the speedy resolution of a dispute and adequate measures for achieving interim
relief and for securing a claim .2
1. Impartiality
Impartiality is emphasized in article 5 of the Procedural Code when it states
that the Arbitrazh Courts and their judges are independent and shall be subject
to the law alone.2' Furthermore, any attempt by organizations or officials to
intervene in the activity of the Arbitrazh Courts and their judges carries with it
statutory liability.22 Articles 6 and 8 of the Procedural Code ensure that the parties
14. See Commentary, supra note 11, at 54.
15. See Law on Arbitrazh Courts, art. 3.
16. See Russia Overhauls System, supra note 11, at 174. For a list of the international treaties
and agreements in which the Arbitrazh Courts take part, see Letter of the Higher Arbitrazh Court
of the Russian Federation No. OM-230 of August 16, 1995.
17. "Russian law permits private parties to have their economic disputes resolved through ADR,
including private arbitration. If the ... court establishes that the parties intended to have their dispute
'arbitrated,' it stays its proceeding and refers the parties to (genuine) arbitration." Russia Overhauls
System, supra note 11, at 174. See Arbitrazh Procedural Code, art. 23.
18. Keeva, supra note 5, at 109.
19. See generally Arbitrazh Procedural Code.
20. Id.
21. Id. art. 5.
22. Id.
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are to be treated equally before the law ,23 and persons that do not speak the
language of the proceedings (Russian) are "ensured the right to get fully ac-
quainted with the case materials and to take part in the judicial actions through
an interpreter, and also the right to use their native tongue in the arbitrazh court."24
Judges may be disqualified when there is a conflict of interest.25 The same is
true for procurators, experts, and interpreters.26 Judges are also prohibited from
participating in more than one hearing.27 Assuming that the laws are heeded
in practice, these provisions appear adequate to protect the parties from unfair
treatment.28
2. Duration of Dispute Resolution
Speedy resolution of disputes is often a reason that parties to an international
agreement prefer arbitration over the use of national courts.29 Arbitration (in the
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) sense) typically takes months, while many
litigation systems may take years. 30 However, the Procedural Code stipulates
that settlement of disputes must not exceed two months from the filing of a claim
23. Article 6 states:
The legal proceedings . shall be conducted on the principles of equality before the
law and before the court of organizations-regardless of their place of location, their
subordination and form of ownership, and of the citizens-regardless of their sex,
race and nationality, their language and origin, their property and their official position,
the place of residence, the attitude towards religion, the convictions and the affiliation
with public associations, and also of the other circumstances.
Id. art. 6.
24. Id. art. 8.
25. Article 16 provides that a judge may not take part in the case: (1) if he is a relative of the
persons taking part in the case, or of their representatives; (2) if he has taken part in the previous
examination of the given case in the capacity of an expert, interpreter, prosecutor, representative,
or witness; (3) if he is personally interested, directly or indirectly, in the outcome of the case or if
there are other circumstances calling into question his impartiality. Id. art. 16. Articles 19-21 place
an obligation on judges, experts, and interpreters to disqualify themselves based on the grounds
mentioned in articles 16 and 17, and lay out the procedures for the challenge to a judge, expert, or
interpreter. Id. arts. 19-21.
26. Experts can be excluded on the same grounds as judges, and in addition on the following
grounds:
1. [where] his official or any other kind of dependence ... on the persons participating
in the case, or the representatives of these persons; 2. [where expert conducted audit],
the materials of which have served as the ground or as the reason for turning to the
arbitration court, or are used in the investigation of the case.
Id. art. 17.
27. Id. art. 18.
28. Though the laws may appear adequate, actual practice may prove otherwise. See Nikiforov,
supra note 6; Zinger, supra note 6 at 181.
29. See William K. Slate II, International Arbitration: Do Institutions Make a Difference?, 31
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 41, 43 (1996); Robert Donald Fischer & Roger S. Haydock, International
Commercial Disputes Drafting an Enforceable Arbitration Agreement, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
941, 948.
30. See Fischer & Haydock, supra note 29, at 954.
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in the Arbitrazh Court.3 The court proceedings are not to be interrupted except
for periods of recess.3 2 In "exceptional cases, the court may recess from a period
not to exceed more than 3 days." 3 3 On certain grounds, a court may suspend a
proceeding. 34 The Arbitrazh Court will then resume the proceedings and examine
the case anew.35
If adhered to, such expedient judicial processing presents the Arbitrazh Courts
as an attractive forum for those seeking prompt resolution of their dispute. How-
ever, one down-side to this aspect is that such expedient measures may not allow
the Arbitrazh Courts to adequately address larger, more complex disputes.36
3. Cost of Arhbitrazh and Expenses
Cost saving is another advantage often mentioned when talking about arbitration
as opposed to litigation in national courts. 7 Tom Arnold, in an article discussing
the hidden traps of arbitration, notes that if one cuts the time involved in an
arbitration proceeding, one will likely save 40 percent of the CoStS. 38 Thus, the
above-mentioned provision for the two-month requirement for dispute settlement
could potentially represent a substantial savings to parties who choose the Ar-
bitrazh Courts (judicial ones) over other ADR methods that may take longer
periods of time (depending on the circumstances).
It is also necessary to survey the court costs in the Russian Arbitrazh Courts,
keeping in mind the current exchange rate of rubles to dollars. 39 Arbitrazh costs
consist of a state duty and expenses involved in the examination of the case. °
State duties are levied on: (1) statements of claim; (2) bankruptcy actions;
(3) applications to enter the case as a third party; (4) applications for establishing
facts of legal importance; (5) appeals; (6) petitions for injunctions; and (7) appeals
31. "The case shall be examined and the decision adopted on it within a term, not exceeding
two months from the date, on which the statement of claim was filed with the arbitration court."
Arbitrazh Procedural Code, art. 114.
32. Id. art. 117(3).
33. Id.
34. Article 120 states:
The arbitration court shall have the right to postpone the examination of the case, if
it cannot be examined at the given session, including as a consequence of some of
the persons, participating in the case, the witnesses, the experts or the interpreters
failing to attend, or if additional [evidence] shall be presented.
Id. art. 120(1).
35. Id. art. 120(3).
36. See Hendrix, supra note 11, at 28.
37. See Slate, supra note 29, at 43; Fischer & Haydock, supra note 29, at 954.
38. Tom Arnold, Delay and Cost Booby Traps in Arbitration Practice and How to Avoid Them,
CA 13 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 99, 105.
39. As of Oct. 3, 1996, the ruble rate was 5,503 rubles per dollar. See Central Bank of Russia
Exchange Rates from 28th November, Russia Express Briefing, Dec. 9, 1996, available in 1996 WL
8619149. The new corridor, set every six months, was set from 5,500 to 6,350. See Moscow Sets
Corridor for Rouble for Full Year as Its Confidence Grows, Russia Express Briefing, Dec. 9, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 8619148 [hereinafter Moscow Sets Corridor].
40. See Arbitrazh Procedural Code, art. 89.
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and cassation complaints against rulings of the court on writs of execution and
refusal to issue writs of execution.4 ' Duties are based on the "price of the claim,"
which is determined from the claimed amount in actions for money damages,
actions challenging writ of execution, or other writ.42 A sliding scale from 5
percent to .05 percent, depending on the value of the claim, is generally used,
with a maximum state duty of approximately $14,000.
4 1
Thus, the cost of resolving a dispute in the Arbitrazh Courts may be substantial,
especially if a claim involves a property dispute, as properties, in Moscow for
example, are some of the most expensive in Europe.' In any case, the maximum
duty limits Arbitrazh costs.
Court expenses are borne by the unsuccessful party, but failure of a party to
comply with the procedural rules entitles the court to impose court expenses on
the party in violation, regardless of the outcome of the case.45
Part of the court costs/expenses are experts, witnesses, and interpreters that
are to receive compensation for expenses incurred in travel and accommodation,
and are to be paid a daily allowance.46 Experts and interpreters are also to be
paid compensation for their work.47 Workers and other employees summoned
to appear as witnesses are also to receive compensation for their time away from
work. 48 Alternatively, the Procedural Code allows for the parties to agree on
apportionment of Arbitrazh costs.
49
For complex disputes involving many witnesses and experts, and likely inter-
preters in international disputes, these costs could be substantial. 50 In less compli-
cated disputes, these costs are not likely to be excessive in comparison with the
same costs in other arbitration fora.51
41. See id. art. 91.
42. Id. art. 92.
43. See id.; Hendrix, supra note 11, at 25.
44. See Aline Sullivan, Real Estate for the Truly Courageous, INT'L HERALD T RB., Jan. 6,
1996, at 15; John Thornhill, Survey of European Business Property: Undeveloped Land Is Expensive-
Markets in Eastern Europe/Moscow, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1996, at 36. See also Mike Trickey,
Moscow's Dazzling New Face Masks Mayhem and Despair, OTTAWA CITIZEN, July 31, 1996; Western
European Cities Become Cheaper, Survey, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, June 13, 1996; Holger Jensen,
Quality of Life in New Russia Is Expensive and Dangerous, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, June 20, 1996, at
3A.
45. See Arbitrazh Procedural Code, art. 95(3).
46. See id. art. 94.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. Id. art. 95.
50. In discussing similar costs involved in arbitration proceedings, Fischer and Haydock note
that "defending a case venued in another country may cause a party to pay substantial travel and
lodging expenses and incur unnecessary attorney's fees by having to hire additional attorneys in
other countries." Fischer & Haydock, supra note 29, at 958.
51. Incidental costs for interpreters, experts, and witnesses may be one of the most expensive
costs for the parties. See id. For foreign persons, this will be particularly so due to the cost of hotels
and restaurants of international standard in Moscow. See Western European Cities Become Cheaper,
supra note 44; Jensen, supra note 44, at 3A. If the court is located outside of Moscow or St.
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4. Interim Relief
Interim relief and measures for securing a claim are provided for in articles
75 and 76 of the Procedural Code:
[The following may be measures for securing claim]:
1) the arrest of the property or of [moneys] belonging to the defendant;
2) [injunction against] defendant to perform certain actions;
3) [injunction against] other persons to perform certain actions...
4) the suspension of the exaction by the writ of execution or by the other document
disputed by the plaintiff in conformity with which the exaction shall be effected
in the indisputable (nonacceptance) order; the suspension of the sale of the property
in case of filing a claim for its release from under the arrest.
52
In most (nonjudicial) arbitration fora these types of measures are not available.
Thus availability of interim relief in the Arbitrazh Courts is advantageous when
such measures are necessary.
5. Enforcement
Another advantage of the Arbitrazh Courts is that a successful party will enjoy
immediate enforcement of a court judgment without having to apply to a Russian
court to enforce a foreign (arbitral or judicial) judgment. 3 However, actually
enforcing a judgment in Russia's court system can be very difficult and time
consuming. 54 One commentator comments that businessmen that decide to have
their legal problems resolved in the Arbitrazh Courts should be prepared for a
lengthy process (several months or years), as well as substantial expenses.55 In
Petersburg, and involves mostly the participation of Russian nationals from the same area as the
court, then costs may be much less. See Trade and Investment in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Russia Express
Briefing, June 24, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8618803 (stating that average Russian wages are
US$2,600 per year); Sullivan, supra note 44. See generally Executive Briefing, Hotels of CIS: Where,
How Much and What For?, Russia Express-Perestroika, Dec. 5, 1994, available in 1994 WL 3224222
(demonstrating that hotels outside Moscow are less).
52. Arbitrazh Procedural Code, arts. 75, 76.
53. See Zinger, supra note 6, at 160-61. A victorious party must apply for leave for execution
before the Arbitrazh Court in which the judgment was made. See Russia Overhauls System, supra
note 11, at 173-74. The Arbitrazh Court then issues a writ of execution and the prevailing party
forwards the writ to the bank in which the losing party maintains an account or submits it to the
bailiff for execution. See id. When the writ is served, the bank is under a legal duty to satisfy
the judgment by debiting the account. See id. For local award enforcement of a foreign award,
a practitioner is required to present a legalized original of the award to a local court, which may
challenge the award. See Zinger, supra note 6, at 160. "Thus, the practitioner whose instinctual
desire is to arbitrate at home and seek award enforcement in Russia, risks the danger that local
courts will not understand the complexities of his demands . . . [A] practitioner who sacrifices
home advantage and has his case heard before a Russian tribunal will have automatic enforcement
of the award .... " Id.
54. See Hendrix, supra note 11, at 34 (describing enforcement as the courts' "achilles heel");
Roberto G. MacLean, Lecture titled Judicial Reform in the Americas, given at Southern Methodist
University (Nov. 8, 1996). MacLean comments that once you receive an award you are not even
half-way finished. Obtaining actual enforcement in Russia can be very difficult. Part of the problem
is the ineffectiveness of court bailiffs and general lack of respect for the judicial system. Id.
55. V. Bublik, Ispolnenie Arbitrazhnikh Reshenii: Zakonodatelstvo i Praktika Evo Primenenia,
4 Khoziaistvo i Pravo 100, 1995.
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addition, he adds that the victor in an arbitral process should not be too quick
to celebrate because the enforcement of the Arbitrazh (judicial) award is a separate
problem to which one will not be able to find a final solution (this being the
reason they spent the time, effort, and money to arbitrate in the first place).56
So, although theoretically there is immediate enforcement of an award, the
reality is that it may not be any easier than trying to enforce a foreign judicial
or arbitral award.57 It should be noted, however, that the Russian legislature
is considering a bill that would improve the bailiff system for enforcement of
awards.58
6. Appellate Review
Appellate review is available in the Russian Arbitrazh Courts.59 The appellate
process in many countries may be a reason to avoid the judicial courts and opt
for arbitration in order to save time and legal costs. 60 The Procedural Code,
however, generally provides that the appellate court must decide a case within
one month from the day it is received. 6' Thus, again, the Russian Arbitrazh
Courts may not represent as much a time delay (and consequently cost) as compa-
rable Western court systems or arbitral fora.62
Taken together, the above aspects of the Arbitrazh Courts make it a sensible
choice in terms of impartiality, time and effectiveness, and possibly cost. How-
ever, as mentioned above, the idealized written law may depart from actual
practice.63 What is done in practice in light of Russia's economic and social
setting may differ greatly.
B. CONCERNS ABOUT THE ARBITRAZH COURTS
1. Lack of Experience
Inexperience in dealing with international commercial transactions is often
cited as one reason parties may wish to avoid the Arbitrazh Courts, despite their
latest statutory developments. 64 The Arbitrazh Courts "have yet to establish their
56. Id.
57. Whether a foreign arbitral award or judgment or a Russian judgment, once a Russian court
issues an order, the problem of enforcement through a bailiff still remains. Id. One of the problems
with the procedure is that the enforcers are "poorly paid bailiffs from local commercial courts; some
are easily tempted into delaying or ignoring settlements." Tatum & Todd, supra note 4, at 12.
58. See Hendrix, supra note 11, at 35.
59. See Arbitrazh Procedural Code, art. 145.
60. See Fischer & Haydock, supra note 29.
61. Arbitrazh Procedural Code, arts. 156, 173.
62. But see Bublik, supra note 55.
63. See Nikiforov, supra note 6, at 2; Zinger, supra note 6.
64. See Zinger, supra note 6, at 160. "[Einforcing business contracts between private parties
remains quite uncertain, in part because of the lack of commercial legislation and judicial experience in
interpreting and enforcing private agreements." Daniel McGrory, Civilizing the Russian Underground
Economy: Requirements and Prospects for Establishing a Civil Economy in Russia, 5 TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 82 (1995).
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credibility and thus provide little comfort for foreign investors at this time." 65
Thus, while inexperience may be a concern, it is a concern that may dissipate
66over time. But certainly while Russia's economy is in a state of transition,
problems of interpreting international commercial contracts will remain.67
2. Impartiality
Impartiality, despite the new laws, is still a large problem, due to the potential
for corruption and bribery, which remain very pervasive in Russia and are unlikely
to improve in the near future.65 Simon G. Zinger, in discussing the Russian legal
system, makes several observations about the effect of corruption on the legal
system in Russia. 69 He notes that "bureaucrats and officials at every level of
government have discovered that the new Russia offers much to gain from hidden
criminal acts." 70 He further explains: "[C]ourts and judges, which once took
their orders directly from Communist Party officials, have been left with little
sense ofjurisprudence or notion of right and wrong. Underfunded and inefficient,
the courts are tempting targets for gangsters who are able to pay for 'justice' on
their own terms. . . . ," Zinger also quotes Russia's Interior Minister as stating
that the amount of money to be gained from corruption "is undermining political
incentive to construct a legal system able to fight crime and build democracy.
As a result of such competition, "a foreign party. . . may discover the procedures
.. . [of] Russia's legal and administrative offices will not resemble the procedures
described by Russian legislation or international conventions.'-
72
Glenn Hendrix, in his review of the Arbitrazh Courts, states that the concerns
of impartiality due to corruption may not be as pervasive as some might suspect.73
65. Barton & Shaheen, supra note 3, at 57.
66. See Koman, supra note 5, at 31 (stating that this Arbitration Act is beginning to change the
misapplication of foreign law, but only time will tell if the new law will open up arbitration so far
as proof of foreign law is concerned).
67. "[Floreign parties should remember that although the Arbitrazh courts possess the authority
to adjudicate commercial disputes, it remains uncertain whether the Arbitrazh courts can function
in Russia's free market economy." Zinger, supra note 6, at 166. By way of example, Mikhail Yukov,
the first vice-president of the Supreme Court of Arbitration, is quoted as saying,
[s]hares and securities-these issues are too complicated for us. [W]e don't understand
them and we have no laws to deal with it .... Our judges never dealt with disputes
on money, shares or bankruptcies. We can't help foreign investors when we have no
rules for the game. We can't protect them from fraud.
Id. at 172-73 (quoting an interview published in Elif Kaban, Russian Courts Have Guns, but No
Share Laws, REUTERS MONEY REP., Apr. 5, 1995).
68. The severe extent of corruption in Russia's courts was noted by the Russian Interior Ministry.
Id. at 175.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 174.
71. Id. at 174-75 (citing Lee Hockstader, Crime Atop Chaos, WASH. J., Mar. 20, 1995, at 6).
72. Id. at 175 (citing CNN Television Interview by Eileen O'Connor with Vadimir Rushailo,
official, Russian Interior Ministry (March 17, 1995) (transcript 1049-9)).
73. Hendrix, supra note 11, at 36-37.
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While he admits that physical intimidation and influence of judicial decisions
exist, Hendrix does not believe it to be standard business practice.74 Hendrix
also points out that since Arbitrazh Courts do not have criminal jurisdiction, they
are less exposed to criminal elements. 7
Hendrix also believes graft to be less common in the judiciary "because there
are many judges who genuinely seek to uphold the law, [and] also due to the
adversarial nature of the litigation process." 76 Because judicial acts are subject
to appeal, there are limits to what a judge may do to influence an outcome.77
Indeed, Hendrix says anecdotal evidence suggests that foreign parties have fared
well in the cases decided, especially against the Russian tax authorities and in
intellectual property rights cases. 78 Hendrix thus concludes that although problems
may still exist, the Arbitrazh Courts serve a more effective role than Western
accounts of the Russian legal system typically state.79
Nevertheless, the effects of corruption on the judiciary's ability to remain
unbiased and independent is also a consideration for parties when deciding how
to resolve their disputes and whether to choose the Arbitrazh Courts as the forum
to resolve their disputes.80
3. Enforcement Abroad of Arbitrazh Decision
Lastly, even though a party would enjoy immediate enforcement of a judgment
rendered by the Russian Arbitrazh Court, that party may face difficulties in having
that same judgment enforced abroad.8' If enforcement of the Russian Arbitrazh
Court is required abroad, such award is subject to execution in a foreign jurisdic-
tion only to the extent that a foreign country recognizes and enforces Russian
judicial decisions. 82 Arbitrazh Court judgments do not enjoy mandatory enforce-
ment under the New York Convention because they are not "foreign arbitral
awards," but are foreign judicial decisions. 3 Thus, it appears that if a Russian
party's assets are solely within Russia, the Russian Arbitrazh Courts may be a
preferable forum, and vice versa.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 36.
76. Id. at 37.
77. Id. Hendrix suggests that the statistics of case volume and the value of the combined cases
indicates that the courts must be doing something right. Id.
78. Id. at 38.
79. Id. at 39.
80. McGrory, supra note 64, at 83.
81. Russia Overhauls System, supra note 11, at 174.
82. Id.
83. Id. See Letter of Higher Arbitration Court, RF No. OM-37 of March 1, 1996 (clarifying
that the New York Convention governs issues of mutual recognition and enforcement on the territory
of the Convention member states of arbitral, not judicial, awards).
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III. International Commercial Arbitration Courts Under the Chamber of
Commerce and Industry
As mentioned, a common forum for arbitration (in the nonjudicial sense) in Rus-
sia is the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI). The CCI was first established
in 1932 and was later structured in the 1970s similar to other Western institutions
in order to develop a positive international reputation. 84 A new law enacted by Rus-
sia in 1993 is the International Commercial Arbitration Act (the Arbitration Act)
which was drafted based on the UNCITRAL Model Law 5 on International Com-
mercial Arbitration .16 Acting in conformity with the Arbitration Act are the Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration Court (ICAC) and the Maritime Arbitration Com-
mission, both under the CCI.8 7 This Comment focuses on the ICAC.
Alan J. Koman points out, in an article comparing the Arbitration Act to past
concerns about arbitrating in the CCI, that under the Soviet Union arbitration
clauses were practically a standard practice in contracts between Western and
Soviet parties (usually a foreign trade organization).88 Koman also notes that
most multinational companies, depending on their bargaining power, could get
arbitration before a neutral institution in a third country, while a smaller Western
party would usually settle for arbitration before the Foreign Trade Arbitration
Commission or the Maritime Arbitration Commission in Moscow. 89 Besides the
enactment of the Arbitration Act, another major development was a "massive
shift of most of the bargaining power to the Western side."9
A. IMPROVEMENTS IN THE CCI
1. Available Arbitors
Arbitrators used to be chosen from a list of exclusively Russian citizens, raising
questions of impartiality and governing language. 9' The Arbitration Act, in article
84. Zinger, supra note 6, at 166.
85. The Model Law is a project undertaken by UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law) "to rectify the 'pitfalls'or 'defects' of international commercial arbitration through
uniformly applicable rules on a variety of topics from composition of the arbitral tribunal, conduct of
arbitral proceedings, role of national courts, to recognition and enforcement of awards." Husain M.
Al-Baharna, Keynote Speech, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN A CHANGING WORLD 25, 34 (Albert
Jan van den Berg ed., ICCA Congress Series No. 6, ICCA Bahrain Conference, 1993).
86. International Commercial Arbitration Act, Sobr.Zakonod. RF, 1993 No. 5338-1, preamble
[hereinafter International Arbitration Act]. Article I stipulates that this Act shall apply to international
commercial arbitration, if the place of arbitration is in the territory of the RF, but that provisions
of articles 8, 9, 35, and 36 will also apply even when the place of arbitration is abroad. Id. art. 1.
87. The ICAC and the Maritime Arbitration Commission are permanent and independent arbitral
tribunals (mediation courts) acting in conformity with the International Commercial Arbitration Act.
Id. annex 1, 11. See also Regulations of the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber
of Industry and Commerce of the Russian Federation, Buill. Norm. Akt. RF, 1995, § 1(1) [hereinafter
ICAC Regulations].
88. Koman, supra note 5, at 26.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 28.
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10, allows the parties to choose the number of arbitrators.92 Article 11 provides
that "[n]o person shall be precluded by reason of his citizenship from acting as an
arbitrator, unless otherwise agreed by the parties." 93 If the number of arbitrators is
to be three, and the two chosen arbitrators of the parties are unable to agree on
a third, then the court will choose the third arbitrator from the court's list.94 The
court will also choose an arbitrator from the list if the parties are unable to agree
when a sole arbitrator is stipulated. 95 Koman presumes that if the court is to
choose the third (or sole) arbitrator due to disagreement of the parties, the court
will choose a Russian.96 However, the ICAC's list also includes foreign arbitra-
tors.97 In any event, the parties are free to agree in advance on a selection procedure
for a third (or sole) arbitrator in an arbitration clause. 98
2. Choice of Language and Forum
Other positive developments under the new Arbitration Act are the ability of
the parties to choose the language of the proceedings as well as the forum. 99
Article 20 allows the parties to agree on the place of arbitration, and article 22
allows the parties to choose the language to be used in the proceedings. o
In absence of agreement on these issues, the court is to decide based on the
circumstances, including the inconvenience to the parties in the case of forum
choice.'' Koman comments, "[i]t is hard to imagine a case involving a Western
party and a Russian party where the court would pick some language other than
Russian as the working language, unless it is required to do so by the parties'
own agreement," and "[o]ne can safely predict that [the] court. . . will continue
to find [Moscow] a very convenient site for settling disputes.', 0 2
According to the ICAC Regulations, the place of arbitration shall be Moscow
and the language shall be Russian, unless otherwise specified by the parties."0 3
However, if the parties agree to hold the hearings at some other location, or in
some other language, the additional costs for doing so (travel, lodging, and
interpreters) will be imposed upon the parties to the dispute."° Therefore, if a
party feels that arbitrating in Russian in Moscow would be undesirable, they
92. Article 10 states, "[tlhe parties shall be free to determine the number of arbitrators....
Failing such determination, the number of arbitrators shall be three." International Arbitration Act,
supra note 87, art. 10.
93. Id., supra note 87, art. 11. See also ICAC Regulations, supra note 88, § 2(3).
94. International Arbitration Act, supra note 87, art. 1 l(3)(a),
95. Id. art. l1(3)(b).
96. Koman, supra note 5, at 28.
97. Hendrix, supra note 11, at 10.
98. Koman, supra note 5, at 28; see also International Arbitration Act, supra note 87, art. 19.
99. Koman, supra note 5, at 29.
100. International Arbitration Act, supra note 87, arts. 20, 22.
101. Id.
102. Koman, supra note 5, at 29.
103. ICAC Regulations, supra note 88, §§ 7, 10.
104. Id. The court may also demand the parties provide for such expenses in advance. Id. § 7(2).
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have the opportunity to stipulate to the contrary in an arbitration clause.'0 5 In
this case, the parties must be ready to accept the additional costs related to this
choice. If the parties are silent, the choice by the ICAC will be arbitration in
the Russian language, located in Moscow.' o
3. Challenge of Arbitors
The Arbitration Act, in contrast to the old law, unmistakably allows arbitrators
to be challenged.' 07 Article 13 sets out the challenge procedure against arbitra-
tors.' 08 If an arbitrator does not withdraw after the agreed-upon procedures for
a challenge are followed, then the arbitration tribunal shall decide the issue.,09
The arbitration tribunal's decision may be appealed to the president of the CCI,
whose decision is not subject to appeal. "0 While such decision is pending, the
arbitration tribunal, including the challenged arbitrator, may continue the pro-
ceedings and make an award. "'
4. Validity of Arbitration Clause and Choice of Law
Koman also discusses the relative improvement involving the law governing
the validity of the arbitration clause, as well as the validity of the contract itself. " 2
He notes that although a court will judge the validity of an arbitration clause
under Russian law regardless of what the parties do, with a limited amount of
research in Russian law a binding clause can be written. "'t With regard to choice
of law, the parties' choice will be respected. '14
5. Bias of Communists
Another previous concern was that the arbitrators were Communists. . .Like
all people who once held high office in the former Soviet Union, the Russian
arbitrators serving on the case may have certain reservations about the virtues
of capitalism."" 6 Koman suggests that the changing realities of life may make
those arbitrators at least less dogmatic." 7
105. Koman, supra note 5, at 29.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. International Arbitration Act, supra note 87, art. 13.
109. Id. arts. 13, 6(1).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Koman, supra note 5, at 30.
113. Id. at 33.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 28.
116. Id. at 32.
117. Id.
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6. Interim Relief
In some instances a down-side of arbitration is lack of the availability of interim
relief: "Arbitrators may avoid requested interim relief measures because they
do not want to appear to favor one party. Sometimes local law is hostile to interim
relief orders, and under some circumstances, applying to a court for interim
relief may be deemed a waiver of the agreement to arbitrate." ' 8 Article 9 of
the Arbitration Act simply states that "[i]t shall not be incompatible with an
arbitration agreement for a party to request, before or during arbitral proceedings,
from a court an interim measure of protection, and for a court to grant such
measure.'"
19
It should also be noted that the ICAC Regulations state that the arbitral tribunal
may grant interim relief. 20 Although this article is general in its terms, it suggests
that Russian courts would not be hostile to interim relief orders by the ICAC
itself, and that such act would not be considered as a waiver of the agreement
to arbitrate. ' 2' In any case, interim relief is available through the Russian courts
should the ICAC not be willing to grant such relief itself.
7. Duration of Proceedings
As mentioned, most parties wish for a speedy resolution to their disputes.'22
The ICAC Regulations address this issue and require that the ICAC take measures
to be completed within 180 days from the date of selection or appointment of
the arbitrator(s). 2 3 It should be mentioned, however, that at the request of the
parties or upon the initiative of the ICAC, the hearing of the case may be laid
off or examination suspended. 24 Methods to avoid excessive time delays through
the drafting of arbitration clauses are discussed below.
B. REMAINING CONCERNS ABOUT THE ICAC
1. Application of Foreign Law
Although choice of law is respected by the tribunal and by Russian courts,
the remaining problem is the risk that the court may misunderstand the foreign
law it is to apply. 25 In the past, the court took a very independent approach and
chose not to rely on foreign law experts. '26 The new law does allow for the court
to appoint experts to report to it and allows the parties to give experts whatever
118. Fischer and Haydock, supra note 29, at 957.
119. International Arbitration Act, supra note 87, art. 9.
120. ICAC Regulations, supra note 88, § 30.
121. International Arbitration Act, supra note 87, art. 9.
122. Slate, supra note 29, at 43.
123. ICAC Regulations, supra note 88, § 11.
124. Id. § 36.
125. Koman, supra note 5, at 31.
126. Id.
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information they require, and even allows the experts to appear at hearings. 27
However, Koman states that the lack of resources has a great deal to do with
the continued ineffectiveness of the courts to apply foreign law.'
There are no foreign law libraries in Russia and no government body in Russia
is spending funds for such libraries. 2 9 Therefore, Russian experts and arbitrators
have no effective means for independently researching foreign law. 130 While this
may be true, there are several Western law firms in Russia that are able to supply
such expertise. 3 ' Their presence may assist the Western parties to a dispute, but
for Russian parties, independent experts, and arbitrators, such advice may come
at a prohibitively expensive price.' 32
2. Conflicts of Interest and Impartiality
Conflicts of interest involving Russian arbitrators have also been a concern in
the past. "' Although the law again appears to address this problem, the economic
realities of Russia's economy continue to create conflicts of interest problems. 34
The new law changed the old in that article 12(1) requires a potential arbitrator
to "disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his
impartiality or independence." 3
In addition, the parties may challenge the arbitrator's impartiality as discussed
above. 36 The problem remains, however, that arbitrators (as with judges) may
be affected by the economic pressures of Russia's society, as Koman notes:
Consider the economic pressure that the arbitrators ... may be under. They are not
on the payroll of the court. Their only compensation for their services comes from
fees charged to the parties. . . . Offering hard-currency supplements to the arbitrators
would only create a conflict of interest where none had existed before and would mortify
the arbitrators, too. The new law has corrected the old problem with disclosure, but
life has created a new one that is much harder to remedy. 37
Despite this potential for conflict and foreign party bias for arbitration in a neutral





131. Some American law firms include Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld; Baker & McKenzie;
Baker & Botts; White & Case; and Vinson & Elkins, to mention only a few. There are other law
firms from other European countries as well.
132. Average prices for lawyers working in Western firms in Moscow range from approximately
$100-$400 per hour.
133. Under the old law, there was no rule giving the arbitrators an affirmative duty to disclose
a conflict of interest in a particular case. Koman, supra note 5, at 29.
134. Id.
135. International Arbitration Act, supra note 87, art. 12(1).
136. Id. art. 13.
137. Koman, supra note 5, at 29.
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unbiased.138 In any case, it is a problem that deserves forethought in deciding
where to arbitrate.
3. Collection of Evidence
Discovery represents another area of continuing concern. 139 Previously, a party
was not allowed to conduct anything like American pre-trial discovery, and a party
could not compel the adverse party, witnesses, and experts to appear at hearings.'40
Additionally, witnesses were not sworn and cross-examination was limited.
14 1
Now, under the Arbitration Act, a party may request assistance in taking evidence
from a competent court in Russia, but as Koman notes, they will only have the
discovery tools provided under the Russian rules of civil procedure. 42 Koman con-
cludes that" [r]ealistically, the Western party shouldjust collect whatever informa-
tion and documents he wants before a dispute breaks out."'
43
4. Lack of Equitable Decision-Making
Koman points to two other concerns, namely that the arbitration proceedings
in the ICAC are much like a trial, and that arbitrators simply apply law to facts
without the ability to make equitable decisions based on what is right or fair.'"
Koman feels that this is the most important point to grasp about arbitrating in
Russia:
In deciding a case, Russian arbitrators will only look to see what result is required by
the law that applies to the transaction. They will not settle a dispute by doing what is
just and equitable (ex equo et bono), even if the parties have expressly authorized this
in their arbitration agreement. They will also not settle a dispute with a decision that
is based on "general principles of law" or on Lex mercatoria. Under both the old and
new laws, they will look only to the applicable law, the terms of the contract, and any
applicable usages of trade, nothing more.145
Thus, one should note how important an effective choice of law clause becomes
in arbitration in the CCI, because the arbitrators are not permitted to base their
decisions on any principles other than the applicable law.'46
138. John I. Huhs & Ramaz A. Beridze, Dispute Resolution in Russia, AM. LAW. Nov. 1992,
at 33. American companies are using the ICAC more frequently, and the ICAC case load is substan-
tially higher than that of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. Hendrix, supra note 11, at 7.




143. Id. at 33.
144. Arbitration proceedings before the major Western institutions are fairly loose and
freewheeling. The atmosphere and tone of an arbitration in Russia could not be
more different. The court in Russia has a semi-official status. It prefers formality to
informality. It applies procedural and substantive law fairly strictly. It views its prior
decisions as precedents, and it tends to strictly enforce contracts. In fashioning a
remedy, it prefers specific performance to a simple award of money damages.
Id. at 31.
145. Id. at 32.
146. Id.
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5. Legal Fees and Arbitration Costs
A last remaining concern of Koman's is that legal fees are not recoverable
under the Arbitration Act, as with the previous law. 14 7 However, the ICAC Regu-
lations state that the victorious party may demand compensation for reasonable
losses borne by it, including expenses for legal representatives. 14' The arbitration
fee is to be paid by the losing party. 1
49
6. Enforceablity of Awards
Enforceability of an award by the ICAC was not really a problem in the former
Soviet Union. 150 However, an increasing number of new Russian enterprises are
no longer funded by the state and are inexperienced in international business
matters, thus causing an increase in the amount of disputes arising."'5 Due to the
financial independence of the Russian enterprises from the state, arbitration
awards are no longer paid as a matter of course.'52
Another concern is that the Arbitration Act does not address the procedure for
enforcing arbitral awards. Although Russia (as a successor to the Soviet Union) is
a signatory to the New York Convention on the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards, legislation has not been enacted in Russia regarding the precise procedure
for the enforcement of awards under the Convention. 153 There is lack of practical
experience with enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Russia. 154 The courts
may be uncertain as to procedures and processes required to execute the foreign
147. Id.
148. ICAC Regulations, supra note 88, app. § 9.
149. Id. § 6.
150. Huhs & Ramaz, supra note 140, at 33. "[I]f the Soviet party actually did go to arbitration
and lose, the award would be paid in due course pursuant to the 1958 United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards." Id.
151. Id. Huhs & Ramaz observe:
The burst of entrepreneurial activity by newly freed-but internationally inexperi-
enced-Russian enterprises, which for the most part are no longer funded by the state
budget and therefore survive (or fail) based on their own resources and resourcefulness,
has dramatically increased litigation between Russian and foreign enterprises ...
Arbitration awards are no longer paid as a matter of course, because they now must
be paid from the resources of the enterprise involved rather than by the state.
Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. Hubs and Ramaz then describe the most accepted procedure (based on Russian procedural
law):
[The most common method] is to present a legalized original of the award through
diplomatic channels to the local court having jurisdiction for execution. The court
can then order the bank holding the funds of the Russian party to pay such funds over
to the foreign party. If the liquid asset [sic] of the debtor are not sufficient to satisfy
the award, the court can order the bailiff to execute on the physical property of the
debtor and to pay the proceeds over to the foreign party.
Id.
154. Id.
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award, which may be tedious, time consuming, and expensive.'5 5 In any case, it
is unlikely that many Russian parties will possess sufficient assets that can easily
be converted into hard currency to pay a substantial award to a foreign party. 
56
If an award is enforceable, another question arises as to the challenges that
may be raised against that award to have it set aside by a judicial court. Here,
the Russian Arbitration Law is in accordance with the New York Convention,
both of which set forth the grounds for a national court to set aside an arbitral
award. 57 Both require proof of the following to set aside ajudgment: (1) incapacity
of party or invalidity of agreement under applicable law; (2) lack of proper notice
of the appointment of an arbitrator or arbitral proceeding or lack of ability of
party to present its case; (3) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by
or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains deci-
sions on matters beyond the scope of the arbitration; or (4) the composition of
the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure is not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties.' 58
Enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if a court finds that the
subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under
Russian Law or that the award is in conflict with the public policy of the Russian
Federation.'59 Thus, the chances that a decision will be overturned by a Russian
court are not much different from the chances a court in another country (that
is a signatory to the New York Convention) would. Generally speaking, the
above grounds are applied narrowly and such actions are rarely taken.'6° Although
155. [Russian Courts] are likely to be uncertain regarding the precise procedures to follow,
and the process of identifying, seizing, and converting the assets of the Russian party




157. International Arbitration Act, supra note 87, art. 34; Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, art. 5 [hereinafter New York Convention],
See also Recognition and Enforcement in the USSR of Foreign Judgements and Arbitrations, June
21, 1988, art. 5, available in 1988 WL 386572.
158. International Arbitration Act, supra note 87, art. 34(2)(a); New York Convention, supra
note 158, art. 5(1).
159. International Arbitration Act, supra note 87, art. 34(2)(b); New York Convention, supra
note 158, art. 5(2).
160. The U.S. courts have a consistent record of enforcement of foreign awards based on a
restrictive reading of the exceptions under the New York Convention. David P. Stewart, National
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Under Treaties and Conventions, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
IN THE 21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS 'JUDICIALIZATION' AND UNIFORMITY? 163, 165 (Richard B. Lillich
& Charles N. Brower eds., Transnat'l Publishers, Inc. 1994) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ARBITRA-
TION IN THE 21ST CENTURY]. Cases such as Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 94 (1973),
and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), have "estab-
lished strong pro-arbitration federal policy in favor of enforcing arbitral clauses and awards in the
international context." Id. "As a practical matter, [these cases] have functioned as the decisional
equivalent of the recently adopted arbitral statutes in various European countries which have accorded
as a matter of public policy greater enforceability to foreign as compared to domestic awards." Id.
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it is unclear, there is evidence that suggests Russian courts will apply a similar
narrow approach in applying the exceptions. 161
7. Ability to Override National Procedural Rules
As demonstrated above, the flexibility given by the Arbitration Act played a
large role in improving the CCI/ICAC and therefore made the ICAC a more
attractive forum than in the past. 62 However, one criticism of this flexibility is
that it goes too far in allowing the parties to override national procedural rules '
63
This fact has the effect of excluding the applicability of rules of procedure pre-
scribed by arbitration law, code of civil procedure, or national rules on evidence,
thus "removing the system of checks and balances derived from procedural law
of lex fori and, concomitantly the role of national courts," and therefore depriving
parties of the assurance of due process of law.'64
Despite the criticism, the flexibility is a positive aspect of the Arbitration law.
The flexibility can help the parties ensure the impartiality of the proceedings,
as well as assist them in ensuring a speedy resolution of their dispute in a country
in which impartiality and effectiveness of dispute resolution are and may remain
questionable in light of the realities of today's Russian society and economy. 1
65
Thus, the drafting of arbitration clauses will play a particularly important role
for parties to a contract involving Russian-related issues.
C. COSTS OF ARBITRATION IN THE CCI/ICAC.
Upon the filing of the statement of a claim, the plaintiff is required to pay a
nonrefundable $500 registration fee that is set against advance arbitration fee
161. See Hendrix, supra note 11, at 6.
162. Koman, supra note 5, at 33; Keeva, supra note 5, at 709.
163. "Traditionally . . . parties specify the applicable substantive law, leaving procedure to the
law of the place of arbitration." Al-Baharna, supra note 86, at 35. Article 19 of the International
Arbitration Act (and UNCITRAL Model Law) changes this by allowing the parties to freely agree
on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting the proceedings. International
Arbitration Act, supra note 87, art. 19(1).
164. Al-Baharna, supra note 86, at 35.
165. Howard M. Holtzmann discusses the need to strike a balance between certainty and flexibility
in international arbitration. Howard M. Holtzmann, Balancing the Need for Certainty and Flexibility
in International Arbitration Procedures, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY,
supra note 161, at 3, 5. He concludes that users of arbitration do not desire to have new, or supplemen-
tary, rules that provide more certainty and less flexibility than existing systems:
There is mounting evidence that users of international arbitration are satisfied with
the balance between flexibility and certainty struck by the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules [adopted by the Russian Federation], . . . [and] Institutions that are highly
sensitive to the desires of users . . . continue to believe that international cases are
best conducted under rules that provide a balance between certainty and flexibility
such as that embodied in the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
Id. See, generally, Koman, supra note 5; Huhs and Ramaz, supra note 139.
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payments.' 66 The arbitration fee is calculated in U.S. dollars based on a scale
beginning with a minimum of $1,400 for claims under $10,000, and a maximum
of $39,440 plus 0.1 percent of the sum over $10 million. 167 The ICAC may also
impose a duty on the parties to supply advance payment for certain additional
expenses.1 68 In particular, the ICAC may demand advance payment to cover
additional expense of the party requesting the action.' 69 Parties that request an
arbitrator residing outside of the place where the ICAC is conducting the hearings
must provide an advance payment to cover the arbiter's expenses. 70 The same
is true for translation costs, but if the language chosen is one other than Russian,
costs are shared equally by the parties.' 7'
Taking into consideration the above observations, it is possible that because
the arbitration process in the ICAC is so much like a trial in which the law
is simply applied to the facts, and that the costs under the ICAC may be
considerably more than those under the Arbitrazh Courts, there is no real
advantage to arbitrating in the CCI/ICAC as opposed to the Arbitrazh
Courts.' 72 However, the flexibility allowed under the CCI/ICAC for parties
to agree to terms and procedure in arbitration clauses will likely mean this
is, and will remain, the preferred forum. 
73
IV. Other Fora for International Arbitration
International commercial arbitration has become a commercial industry in its
own right, with several competing arbitral institutions to choose from. 174 This
comment focuses on the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Com-
merce (SCC Institute) and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).
166. ICAC Regulations, supra note 88, § 18, app. § 2. The chairman of the ICAC has the
right to pass a ruling on raising the amount of the arbitration fee. Id. app. § 3(2). There are also
instances in which the arbitration fee can be reduced (e.g., single arbiter, early withdrawal, or
termination without a decision). Id. app. § 4.
167. Id. app. § 3(1).




172. Koman, supra note 5, at 31; ICAC Regulations, supra note 88, app. § 3(1).
173. For a claim of $1,000,000, the Arbitrazh Court state duty is capped at a maximum of
approximately $14,000, while the ICAC costs would be $16,240. Hendrix, supra note 11, at 8,
25. The CCI remains the preferred forum over the Russian judicial courts, offering experience in
international contract disputes and offering the freedom to choose the law governing the dispute.
Zinger, supra note 6, at 168.
174. AI-Baharna, supra note 86, at 30. Figures show that in terms of venue, France is the most
favored place, followed by Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, Austria,
and Sweden. Julian Lew, Business and the Law: The Facts of Arbitration: English Pre-eminence
Has Proved a Myth, FIN. TImas LTD., May 21, 1996, at 32.
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A. ARBITRATION INSTITUTE OF THE STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
The SCC Institute was founded in 1917.' Parties to Russian-American con-
tracts often choose the SCC Institute for resolution of contract disputes, and
Russian businesses tend to prefer this forum.176 This preference developed when
Russia was still part of the Soviet Union because Sweden is neutral and convenient
for the Russians. 17' Due to this preference, in 1976 Sweden partially revised its
arbitration laws based on a study conducted by the Russian CCI and the American
Arbitration Association to determine the acceptability of Sweden as an interna-
tional arbitration center.178 Since then the SCC Institute functioned as an interna-
tional arbitration institution and became particularly known for handling disputes
involving East-West trade. 179 Effective January 1, 1988, the SCC Institute began
to promulgate its own arbitration rules that will apply unless the parties otherwise
agree.'
1. Reasons to Arbitrate in the SCC Institute
Swedish neutrality played a large role in its popularity in East-West trade in
the past, and the SCC Institute grew in popularity as an international arbitration
forum partly for this reason."'8 On the significance of the place of arbitration as
a practical and psychological factor, Edwin R. Alley, in a review of the SCC
Institute, refers to some of the considerations that bear on the selection of the
location of the proceedings: ease of transportation to the arbitration site for the
parties; local infrastructure of the arbitration site (i.e., roads, hotels, meeting
facilities, communications); and an independent and neutral country for the arbi-
175. The SCC Institute is one of the leading arbitration centers in the world. SCC ARBITRATION,
THE ARBITRATION INSTITUTE OF THE STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Chs. 1, 2. It is an
independent entity within the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. Id. It is a forum for domestic and
international dispute resolution, playing an essential role in the Swedish legal system. This is the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. <http://www.chamber.se/english/enl.htm. >.
176. Russia Overhauls System, supra note 11, at 174; Russian businesses prefer arbitration under
the rules of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. Lew, supra note 175, at 32.
177. John P. Karalis, International Joint Ventures: A Practical Guide, JOINTVEN § 5.42 (1992).
178. Id.
179. Jean Heilman Grier, Providing for Arbitration in International Business Transactions, 863
PRACTICING L. INST. CORP. L. AND PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 9, 21 (1994); the SCC Institute
"became an important center for international arbitrations involving Russia and the other states of
the Soviet Union, and subsequently China as well." W. Lawrence Craig, Some Trends and Develop-
ments in the Laws and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 14
(1995).
180. These rules were designed after a study of rules of the ICC, UNCITRAL, London Court
of International Arbitration, and the AAA in an attempt to take the best from each set of rules and
to omit unnecessary or unacceptable rules. Karalis, supra note 178.
181. "The SCC Institute, whose potential in such arbitrations results in part from Sweden's
neutrality as well as from its long history of legal sanction [sic] forarbitration, is also being increasingly
used in non-East/West trade disputes." Edwin R. Alley, International Arbitration: The Alternative
of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 22 INT'L LAW. 837, 839 (1988).
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tration. 12 Sweden certainly makes an attractive forum in terms of neutrality but
its convenience will depend on the location of the respective parties. 83 If the
Russian party is in European Russia, Sweden may well be convenient, but for
parties located in Siberia or the Russian Far East, Sweden may not be the most
convenient forum for dispute resolution.84
As with the Russian Arbitration Act, the rules under the SCC Institute allow a
great deal of flexibility for the parties to select the applicable arbitration procedure
(many choose the UNCITRAL rules) and the applicable law governing the dis-
pute, as well as the place of arbitration and language or languages to be used. 185
In the event the parties fail to agree on these aspects, the tribunal makes the
determination according to the applicable rules. 18 6 The same is true for the selec-
tion of arbitrators. 187
The SCC Institute rules help ensure the neutrality of the arbitrators (who may
be of the same nationality) by requiring them to disclose "any circumstances
which might be deemed to diminish trust in his impartiality or independence,"
182. Id. at 841.
From a purely practical point of view it is important that the place of arbitration is
situated in a country and city to which there is easy transport from the country of
residence of the parties and to which the parties and their lawyers have easy access.
. . . Local facilities with respect to hotels, meeting rooms, mail and telex connections,
. . . must be satisfactory. . . . It is very important that the parties are confident that
their dispute is determined in an independent and neutral manner. The choice of the
place of arbitration is important also in this respect. One of the reasons why parties
to an international contract agree to arbitration is the wish to have a neutral decision.
Id. (quoting Philip, Significance of the Place of Arbitration in International Arbitration, 1985 Y.
B. ARB. INST. STOCKHOLM CHAMBER COM. 37).
183. Huhs and Ramaz, supra note 139, at 33.
184. Id. Huhs and Ramaz note:
[I]t has become virtually important to focus in detail on the dispute resolution mecha-
nism in legal documents concluded with Russian parties. Third-country arbitration is
still preferred . . . . [but] [flor purely domestic transactions between a foreign-owned
Russian company and a domestic party, arbitration in Russia (or even use of the
Russian courts) may be more practical, particularly if the Russian party is remotely
located, far from Western Forums.
Id.
185. Harry Arkin, New Opportunities for Arbitration in East/West Trade, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAW.
495, 507 (1990); "The SCC Institute often is chosen as an appointing authority under the UNCITRAL
Rules." Alley, supra note 182, at 839; Karalis, supra note 178 (parties may agree on the language
or languages to be used in the arbitration).
186. Karalis, supra note 178.
187. The SCC method for choosing an arbitrator is also similar to that of the Russian rules:
In SCC Institute arbitration, there are three arbitrators, unless the parties agree other-
wise. If there is a sole arbitrator, he or she is appointed by the SCC Institute; if there
is more than one, the parties appoint an equal number and the SCC Institute appoints
one arbitrator, who is the chairman. The Institute will appoint all members of the
panel if the parties agree. Parties who are interested in avoiding delay in the appointment
phase of the proceedings may prefer the advantage that inheres when the Institute
appoints the neutral arbitrator.
Alley, supra note 182, at 840.
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and subjecting them to challenges from the parties. 88 "'In practice, most SCC
Institute arbitrations 'run very smoothly,' and such problems as challenges to
arbitrators, refusals by parties to participate in the proceedings, and objections
to the validity or applicability of the arbitration agreement are infrequent." '89
The limited ability to challenge an award under the SCC Institute rules is also
seen as making it an attractive forum for international arbitration.'90 Under the
Swedish Arbitration Act, a challenge to an award must be received within sixty
days after the receipt of the award.' 9' The reviewing court cannot substitute its
own judgment, and must give great deference to the arbitrator's decision. 92 The
challenges to a decision are that the arbitrators (1) went beyond the scope of
the issues presented; (2) rendered the arbitral award after the agreed-upon time
expired; (3) decided a case that is nonarbitrable in Sweden; or (4) were disqualified
to serve or that the decision was probably influenced by an irregularity in the
procedures. 193 In addition to the finality of the award, another strength of the
SCC Institute is the high likelihood that the judgment will be enforced in light
of Sweden being a signatory to both the New York Convention and the Geneva
Convention of 1927 on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 194
The cost of arbitration under the SCC Institute is determined by the arbitrators
on a case-by-case basis based on time spent, complexity of the case, and the
amount in dispute. '9 Alley notes that although the parties are jointly and severally
liable for the fees due to the SCC Institute and to the arbitrators, the tribunal
will usually order the losing party to pay the SCC Institute and the arbitrators,
as well as the costs of the prevailing party. 196 To help ensure payment, security
for costs is posted at the outset of a dispute that is meant to cover anticipated
compensation of the arbitrators and the SCC Institute.197
Perhaps one of the more compelling reasons to choose the SCC Institute is
its ability to handle complex cases and its experience in dealing with Russian
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 844.
191. Karalis, supra note 178, § 5.42 n.il.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Alley, supra note 182, at 842.
195. Id. at 843. The arbitrators determine the amount of compensation due to them in their
final award. SCC Institute Rules § 30 (1988). In addition to remuneration, they are also to receive
reimbursement of their expenses. SCC Arbitration, supra note 176, ch. 12. Since most Swedish
arbitrators are practicing attorneys, the fees are normally in line with those of the attorney-arbitrator.
The compensation due to the SCC Institute is normally fixed in accordance with the regulations
issued by the SCC Institute. Id. The regulations provide ranges based on the amount in dispute. Id.
The minimum amount due is 2,000 Swedish Crowns. See SCC Institute Rules Regulations app. Id.
The percentages for the ranges vary from 4% of the amount in dispute (up to 100,000 Swedish
Crowns) to as little as 0.01% of the amount in dispute (over 100,000,000 Swedish Crowns). Id.
196. Alley, supra note 182, at 843.
197. This amount posted is not binding on the final determination of amounts due at the end of
the process.
VOL. 32, NO. 1
ARBITRATION ALTERNATIVES WITH A RUSSIAN PARTY 143
parties involved in international disputes.198 Alley concludes that although it is
not among the largest of the international arbitration forums, the SCC Institute
has achieved a respected role in international arbitration, and parties who are
about to enter into a contract that will contain an arbitration clause clearly can
consider that Institute to be a dispute resolution forum that will act impartially
and expeditiously, and that will have adequate institutional expertise and facilities
to accommodate even complex arbitrations.'" This is not to say that the SCC
Institute is without criticism.
2. Potential Problems with the SCC Institute
Although the SCC Institute rules provide that arbitrators make their award not
later than one year after the case is referred to them, the rule also authorizes the
Institute to extend the period under appropriate circumstances at the request of
the arbitrators. 200 As Alley observes, in practice this time limit has occasionally
proven to be too short, especially when dealing with East-West trade disputes.2"'
Tom Arnold, in an article focusing on the hidden booby traps of unexpected
delay and cost in arbitration, states that unless case management and expedition
are addressed in an arbitration clause to a contract, the parties will face time
delays that may exceed a year.20 2 One of the reasons for this delay is that arbitrators
have other responsibilities and receive a number of smaller, easier projects that
take up their time, never giving them the large amount of time desired for a
complex case.20 3 Arnold believes this is particularly common in complex, three-
arbitrator cases. 2 4 While time delays may be a problem in the SCC Institute,
parties may avoid such delays through arbitration clauses explicitly requiring an
expediter for case management, a specific time period for the resolution of the
198. "SCC arbitrations cover the usual range of subjects of international arbitration, such as sales
contracts, construction projects, license agreements, and many other categories of commercial issues.
The international cases on the SCC Institute's docket typically are substantial and complex." Alley,
supra note 182, at 839.
199. Id. at 844.
200. Id. at 842.
201. Id.; Arkin, supra note 186, at 507. (SCC Institute subject in practice to increasing criticism
of lack of timelines).
202. Arnold, supra note 38, at 104.
203. Id. at 106.
204. Id. Arnold notes that when three arbitrators are used, there may be scheduling difficulties,
especially when the arbitrators are busy people who will find it difficult to find many days in sequence
to attend the proceedings (and to travel to those proceedings). Id. at 111. Another reason for the
increased time delay with three arbitrators is that among three arbitrators, none will essentially
effectively assume the role of case manager and expediter. Id. Yet another reason for delay is that
the drafting of a decision by three arbitrators involves more time and money to negotiate a consensus.
Id. In an attempt to avoid error in the reasons for the award (and thus a challenge of the award),
the arbitrators try to be careful even on immaterial facts. Id. at 118. "You cannot imagine the
immense amount of time that three people can spend checking details the other guy had in his draft
reasons only some of which are material." Id. Lastly, the delay of one of the arbitrators affects all
of them. Id. at 106.
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dispute, and other provisions that will reduce the amount of delay due to dilatory
arbitrators. 20'
Another potential for delay may be caused by the SCC Institute's liberal rules
regarding the appearance of counsel and admissibility of evidence. 2°6 Arnold
suggests that if proper precautions are not taken in drafting an arbitration clause,
the parties may be highly frustrated by "having arbitrator(s) receive monumental
amounts of prejudicial, immaterial and/or redundant evidence costing months of
time and thousands of dollars in associated fees and costs; .... "207 Therefore,
without taking the proper precautions, arbitration under the SCC Institute may
cause problems due to its liberal admission of evidence.20 8 But again, this problem
can be remedied through a thoughtful arbitration clause.2°9
B. THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF ARBITRATION
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) is still the most widely used
and respected international arbitration institution. 210 The ICC was founded in
1923 in Paris, France, and is a nongovernmental organization composed of repre-
sentatives of more than fifty countries from nearly every continent. 2 ' The main
functions of the ICC in overseeing an arbitration process are (1) designating
arbitrators; (2) reviewing and confirming appointment of arbitrators nominated
by the parties; (3) reviewing and deciding challenges to arbitrators; (4) scrutiniz-
205. These will be discussed further below. See generally Arnold, supra note 38, chs. 5(a-i), 6.
206. Alley, supra note 182, at 842. Alley observes:
The parties may choose any person to assist them, whether or not a lawyer, and the
Rules contain no limitation in that respect. Absent an agreement to the contrary, an
arbitrator may consider both written and oral evidence, and there are very few, if
any, restrictions upon the admissibility of evidence in Swedish arbitration proceedings.
Under the Rules, the tribunal may appoint an expert witness.
Id.
207. Arnold, supra note 38, at 116. Arnold outlines the problem as follows:
[P]arties introduce prejudicial slurs at each other, often by immaterial or redundant
evidence. The responses to that prejudicial evidence then also come in, and pretty
soon you are "trying" a myriad of immaterial prejudicial issues with relatively little
attention to the issue submitted to arbitration in the contract to arbitrate, and at tremen-
dous expense in time and money.
Id. at 116.
208. Id.; Alley, supra note 182.
209. Arnold suggests the following language: "[t]he arbitrator shall have the power and authority
and is instructed to exclude evidence on grounds of prejudice, immateriality and/or redundancy, and
no ruling by the arbitrator rejecting evidence on such ground shall be a ground for vacating the
arbitration award." Arnold, supra note 38, at 117.
210. Lew, supra note 175, at 32. In 1995 the court's activity continued to increase as it has over
the past 20 years, and for the first time the ICC received more than 400 new requests for arbitration.
7 ICC INT'L COURT OF ARB. BULLETIN No. I (May 1996). This is in addition to the 855 cases
pending at the end of 1995. Id. In 1996 the ICC received their 9,000th case. Id.
211. ICC Int'l Court of Arb. 6 (June 1994).
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ing and approving awards; and (5) fixing arbitrators' fees.212 Generally speaking,
the ICC goes further in providing institutional guidance and supervision over
the arbitration proceedings than do the rules of other institutions.2 13
1. Advantages of Arbitrating in the ICC
One of the main focuses of the ICC is the maintenance of trust between the
parties and the person that may be required to resolve their dispute.21 4 To achieve
this the ICC has safeguards to (1) ensure the impartiality of the arbiter; (2) ensure
the arbiter is competent in the subject matter; and (3) ensure that the arbiter
knows the law and practices of international trade.215
As with most arbitration institutions, neutrality and impartiality can be facili-
tated in the ICC by the choice of nationality of arbitrators, the place of the
proceedings, and the language of the proceedings.216 For the designation of arbitra-
tors, the ICC differs from the SCC Institute and the ICAC, in which three arbitra-
tors are designated if the parties fail to nominate the number of arbitrators.
217
Under the ICC Rules of Arbitration, a dispute may be settled by a sole arbitrator
or by three arbitrators.218 If the parties select a sole arbitrator, they may nominate
the arbitrator for confirmation by the court.219 If the parties fail to nominate a
sole arbitrator, the arbitrator is appointed by the court. 220 Likewise, if the parties
do not agree upon the number of arbitrators, a sole arbitrator is appointed by
the court. 2 1 "Particularly when the amount in dispute is small, the designation
of more than one arbitrator can increase quite considerably, and unreasonably,
the cost of an arbitration and also delay the prosecution of the case.""'
An additional emphasis in the ICC is on the use of arbitrators experienced in
international trade.223 For this purpose, the ICC Court enjoys the assistance of
the ICC National Committees in nearly sixty different countries, which assist
the ICC Court in identifying potential arbitrators with appropriate qualifications
212. Id.
213. Slate, supra note 29, at 47.
214. H. Frans van den Hoven, Commercial Disputes and Their Settlement: A Factor in Business
Planning, in 60 YEARS OF ICC ARBITRATION: A LOOK AT THE FUTURE 35, 37 (ICC Publishing
S.A., 1984).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 45 (Commentary by Jean-Pierre Bouyssonie). See generally ICC Rules of Conciliation
and Arbitration.
217. International Arbitration Act, supra note 87; Alley, supra note 182.
218. ICC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration, art. 2.2.
219. Id. art. 2.3.
220. Id.
221. Id. art. 2.5. However, when it appears to the court that the dispute warrants the appointment
of three arbitrators, each party is given 30 days to nominate an arbitrator. Id.
222. The ICC Int'l Court of Arb. 7 (June 1994).
223. "National judges rarely have the same knowledge of the customs of international trade as
do arbitrators, especially when it is not a question of codified trade customs. Bouyssonie,
supra note 217, at 46.
SPRING 1998
146 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
all over the world.224 The parties are also free to choose their own arbitrators
without being restricted to a list.225 In the event an arbitrator (or tribunal chairman)
is appointed by the ICC Court, that arbitrator is generally forbidden to be of the
same nationality as either of the parties.226 Taken together, these provisions go
further than the SCC Institute and the ICAC in ensuring the impartiality and
expertise of the arbitrators.
As seen with other fora, the ability to choose the applicable law, place, and
language of the proceedings is also available under the ICC in order to ensure
impartiality and neutrality.227 The arbitrators are required to disclose any facts
or circumstances that may call into question the arbitrator's independence in the
eyes of the parties, and the parties also have the ability to challenge an arbitrator
they believe to be biased or otherwise unacceptable.228
The intervention of a strictly international institution such as the ICC also
helps to maintain neutrality.2 29 "Unlike many other institutions, the ICC Court
monitors the entire arbitral process, from the time the arbitral tribunal receives
the file from the ICC." 230 The ICC regularly reviews the progress of all pending
cases, and considers whether any measures needed to be taken to ensure that the
case advances expeditiously and according to the rules.23' The staff of the Court's
Secretariat receives copies of all written communications and pleadings in the
arbitration proceedings.232
One unique aspect of the ICC's involvement is the drafting of "terms of refer-
ence." The terms of reference bring the parties together at an early stage to
consider the issues they are required to deal with and the organization of the
arbitration.233 It is here that the parties may also reach agreement on certain
224. The ICC Int'l Court of Arb. 7 (June 1994).
225. "[T]he ICC does not require that arbitrators be selected from pre-determined lists, thus
ensuring the greatest possible freedom of choice in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal." Id.
226. ICC Arbitration Rules article 2.6 provides:
The sole arbitrator or the chairman of the arbitral tribunal shall be chosen from a
country other than those of which the parties are nationals. However, in suitable
circumstances and provided that neither of the parties objects . . . the sole arbitrator
or the chairman of the arbitral tribunal may be chosen from a country of which any
of the parties is a national.
ICC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration, art. 2.6.
227. Id. arts. 12, 13.1, 13.3; ICC Int'l Court of Arb. 9 (June 1994).
228. ICC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration, art. 2.7.
229. The Court of Arbitration is made up of members nominated by different National Committees
of the organization. The ICC Int'l Court of Arb. 7 (June 1994).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 8.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 7. Before proceeding with a case, the arbitrator is to draw up a document defining
his Terms of Reference. ICC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration, art. 13.
The document is to include: a) the full names and description of the parties, b) the
addresses of the parties to which notifications or communications . . . may be made,
c) a summary of the parties' respective claims, d) definition of the issues to be deter-
mined, e) the arbitrator's full name, description and address, f) the place of arbitration,
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outstanding issues that were not agreed upon in advance, such as substantive law
or applicable language.
234
The ICC Court is also involved in setting the arbitrator's fees.
[T]he arbitrators are not remunerated on the basis of an hourly or daily rate, and the
arbitrators play no role in determining their own fees. Rather, their fees are fixed by
the ICC Court at the end of the arbitration on the basis of a published scale attached
to the ICC Rules.. .. [T]he Court also takes into account the time spent by the arbitra-
tors, the rapidity of the proceedings and the complexity of the dispute.235
The intention of this system is to encourage the efficient handling of cases
with the fee compatible to the amount at stake in arbitration, and to discourage
the submission of frivolous claims and counterclaims.236 The scale also allows
the parties to estimate the cost of arbitration at the beginning of the process.237
Unlike most arbitration institutions, under the ICC it is not the arbitrator who
decides the prima facie validity of the arbitration; it is the institution that has
the authority to make this determination. 238 Likewise, after an award is rendered,
the ICC Court is once again involved, as scrutiny of arbitral awards is one of
the most important functions of the ICC Court.239
In ICC arbitration. . . scrutiny is a key element in helping to ensure that arbitral awards
are of the highest quality possible and less susceptible to annulment in the national
courts than they might otherwise be. . . . The scrutiny process . . . provides parties
with an additional layer of protection that would not otherwise be available, since arbitral
awards are not generally subject to appeal [in other arbitration institutions] . .'40 The
heavy institutional involvement of the ICC in the arbitral process helped it achieve its
reputation for fairness, quality, and impartiality. 4
2. Criticisms of the ICC
The ICC's quality control measures discussed above lead to criticisms due to the
additional cost and time added by those measures. 242 The former vice-president,
g) particulars of the applicable procedural rules and, if such is the case, reference to
the power conferred upon the arbitrator to act as amiable compositeur, h) such other
particulars as may be required....
Id.
234. The ICC Int'l Court of Arb. 16 (June 1994).
235. Id. at 8. The scale for administrative expenses ranges from a minimum of US$2,000 for
disputes up to $50,000 to $65,500 for disputes over $80 million. ICC Rules, app. III. The scale for
arbiter's fees ranges from a minimum of $2,000 or 15% of the amount in dispute for disputes up
to $50,000 to 0.01 %-0.05% of the amount in dispute for disputes over $100 million. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Slate, supra note 29, at 47. See ICC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration, arts. 7, 8.3.
239. The ICC Int'l Court of Arb. 6 (June 1994).
240. Id.
241. In the words of a former vice president of the ICC, "[tihere is no denying that the ICC
offers a mechanism for international institutional arbitration which is unique in the world, for it
stands for impartiality, expertise, experience and competence of its arbitrators." H. Frans van den
Hoven, supra note 215, at 37.
242. Id.
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quoted above, also acknowledges that the ICC is criticized for being expensive
and slow, and that the appointment procedures may be complicated.
243
Tom Arnold asserts that one is almost guaranteed over a year longer in time
and over $100,000 added expense in a complex international license or other
commercial dispute when transaction lawyers, inexperienced in arbitration, put
arbitration clauses into contracts that, among other choices, choose the ICC as
case administrator versus ad hoc arbitration under CPR or UNCITRAL rules.244
Arnold recognizes the Terms of Reference procedure as a quality control measure
and states that it is theoretically very important and very helpful, but that practi-
cally this is not so in the great majority of cases.145 Arnold suggests that this
procedure may even be more expensive and time consuming than the value added
by this step.2 6
Although review of the award for quality control purposes is desirable, it is
costly in time and in money .247 Arnold describes why this is particularly so when
the award is returned for revision to three arbitrators from different countries
after the first submission: "They are likely then off on new frolics, have forgotten
much of the evidence, and tend to be both slow and substantively not excellent
in the award revision work.
2 48
Arnold suggests that if one has experienced arbitrators, the award revision
is not cost effective on average, but if the arbitrators are new and inexperi-
enced, award revision is cost effective on average. 249 Thus, in light of the
ICC's emphasis on experienced arbitrators from around the world, the chances
that this review procedure will add value is questionable. The value of the
step is further questionable because in the large number of countries that are
signatories to the New York Convention, the same defenses to an arbitral
award are available. 250 Thus, if experienced arbitrators are used in either the
ICAC or the SCC Institute, it should be rather predictable and easy to avoid
243. Id.
244. "[ln big-buck complex cases [there is] perhaps one-in-four risk of ... [a] horror stor[y]
of several years of time and millions of dollars." See Arnold, supra note 38, at 104 (citing Pilkington
v. PPG, a case that was in arbitration seven and a half years and that resulted in arbitration fees of
$24 million, attorneys' fees of $37.5 million, and an award on the merits of $7.5 million; also citing
Intel v. AMD, in which a six- to eight-week total for arbitration was agreed to, but it lasted four
and a half years, and was then appealed in the courts for approximately two and a half years).
245. Id. at 107.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 108.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. The defenses are: invalidity of the arbitration agreement or incapacity of a party under
applicable law; lack of fair notice or inability of a party to present his case; an award outside the
scope of the submission to arbitrate; composition of the arbitral tribunal that is not within the agreement
of the parties; an award that has not yet become binding; subject matter of the dispute not falling
within the category of those able to be settled by arbitration under the law; or the recognition or
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country. New York Conven-
tion, supra note 158, art. 5.
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the overturning of an arbitral award without the extra step that may cost time
and money in the ICC.
As discussed above, the number of arbitrators can also have an impact on the
cost of the arbitration.25" ' Recall the following quote from the ICC: "Particularly
when the amount in dispute is small, the designation of more than one arbitrator
can increase quite considerably, and unreasonably, the cost of an arbitration and
also delay the prosecution of the case." 252 This is certainly true, but Arnold also
points out that even in moderately complex cases the use of three arbitrators
means more than merely three times the cost of an arbitrator's fee, and "in a
complex international case with a necessarily long reasoned award, three are
extremely, shockingly, less efficient than one. . . . The total cost with three
arbitrators may well be 10 times greater in money and 12 or 15 months longer
in time than with one arbitrator." 253 Of course, as Arnold notes, there are advan-
tages to using three arbitrators, but the potential disadvantages must also be
taken into account when making the decision, and one of those is added cost.
254
Therefore, this default rule to one arbitrator could work to the cost and time
benefit of parties that fail to choose the number of arbitrators, whereas the choice
of three arbitrators in a complicated dispute may not always be the wiser choice.
Another potential disadvantage of arbitration in the ICC is the method by which
arbitrator's fees are set in part by the complexity of the case. 255 This may cause
the arbitrators to portray the case as more complex and cause them to be less
time sensitive in order to perfect the reasoning of the award. 256 Arnold advises
providing for either a naked award or for a 1,500-word or five-page limit on
reasons to remedy this problem.257
Lastly, it is important when considering the ICC (or any other forum) to
question the amount of investment one is willing to put into an arbitral process
251. Arnold, supra note 38.
252. The ICC Int'l Court of Arb. 7 (June 1994).
253. Arnold, supra note 38, at 110.
254. Some of the advantages that Arnold notes are that a panel of three is capable of supplying
a better balance of expertise than a single arbitrator, and the judgment of a panel of three is arguably
of higher quality due to the debates and interactions between the arbitrators. Id. at 109. In addition,
Arnold states that the judgment of a panel of three may stifle eccentricities that might be present in
the judgment of an individual neutral. Id. at 112. "However, to make the best choice possible
regarding the number of arbitrators, parties should also be aware of the advantages of using one or
two arbitrators and the disadvantages of using three." Id. at 109.
255. Id. at 119.
256. Arnold provides the following example:
[T]he arbitrators are inclined to write on all of the issues submitted to them so that
the ICC, which sets the fees, will know how complex the case was and will set the
fee accordingly. Further, most careful arbitrators inherently want to write their reasons
in detail to justify themselves to the losing party and show how careful they were.
• • * And the parties get to pay for all that writing and polishing.
Id.
257. Id. at 118, 120.
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and to question if the amount spent is worth the extra quality safeguards the ICC
provides.258
V. Choosing a Forum
So each discussed forum has its advantages and disadvantages, but the question
remains as to which forum is preferable for parties to a Russian contract. Before
making such a decision, the parties must first determine what their goal of arbitra-
tion is, other than the pure resolution of the dispute. One view is that parties to
international transactions choose to arbitrate not because arbitration is simpler
than litigation, cheaper, final and binding, and largely nonreviewable, or because
arbitrators have more expertise than national judges, but because neither wishes
to subject its rights and obligations to determination by the courts of the other's
nationality.259 In other words, impartiality and neutrality. Of course, issues of
cost, simplicity, and time are undoubtedly factors in one's decision as to a forum
for arbitration, as these are often the strengths of arbitration over traditional
litigation.2 60
The question then is whether the Russian fora (the Arbitrazh Courts and the
CCI/ICAC), in comparison with more traditional Western fora (the SCC Institute
and the ICC), offer enough impartiality as well as ability for review and quality
control, while at the same time offering a relatively convenient forum with relative
cost benefits, to make them an attractive forum for dispute resolution. Generally, a
decision on forum may depend on the following: (1) complexity of the commercial
relationship; (2) location of the parties and primary business activity; (3) location
of parties' assets; (4) reputation and local influence of the Russian party;
(5) number of potential parties to an arbitration; (6) languages of communication
of the parties; and (7) nature of the contract of potential dispute.
When taking the above factors into consideration, it is important to keep in
mind the effect the choice will have on the parties in terms of cost and potential
burden, as well as any disadvantages in terms of impartiality. 26' The more complex
and involved the case, the more potential there is for increased costs, and thus the
greater the desire to ensure impartiality, neutrality, and quality control. Indeed, it
258. Van den Hoven, supra note 215, at 43. Frans van den Hoven likens the principle in financial
management (that the amount of investment should lead to a fair return on the capital spent) to
international arbitration. Id. "lI]nvesting in arbitration means investing in trust.... The more trust
we have in those called to settle our disputes, the greater the chance that we have made a sound
investment." Id. Van den Hoven says that the investment can be measured if the balance between
the risk to be incurred and the money to be spent is positive. Id. The risk is that of "an unbalanced
and hence unjust decision or award which fails to meet the needs of international trade." Id.
259. Charles N. Brower, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 161,
at intro. ix, x.
260. Fischer and Haydock, supra note 29, at 948.
261. For example, choice of a language that will require minimal translation and interpretation
costs and that will not prejudice and choice of a convenient forum so as to reduce travel and lodging
costs and to provide for neutral territory.
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is fair to say that the more complex and involved the potential dispute is, the
less likely Russian Arbitrazh Courts will be the best forum, due to their lack of
experience and potential for being improperly influenced.262 However, the CCI/
ICAC appears to offer an adequate alternative for parties that wish for the arbitra-
tion to remain in Russia.263 It is equally fair to say that neutral, quality awards
are almost certain to result from the SCC Institute and the ICC, but at perhaps
a cost in terms of expense and time.2 6"
VI. Arbitration Clauses
Since there are an infinite number of possible factual scenarios surrounding
contracts with Russian parties, many of the concerns over excessive cost and
time involved in arbitration (in any arbitration forum) can be met through the
prudent drafting of arbitration clauses.265
Some key areas to address in an international commercial arbitration clause
are: (1) scope of dispute; (2) type of dispute; (3) validity of arbitration clause
and agreement; (4) applicable rules; (5) place of arbitration; (6) number of arbitra-
tors and method of selection; (7) language of arbitration proceedings; (8) timing
of claims; and (9) choice of law. 266 As suggested by Arnold, there should also
be an expedite/case management clause.267 If the parties do choose the arbitration
rules of a particular forum, they should cross-reference those rules with their
drafted arbitration clause to avoid any inconsistencies. 68
A final point to keep in mind when drafting an arbitration clause involving
arbitration in Russia is that the parties should be careful about using the term
"arbitration." 269 As noted, the term "arbitration" may refer to either the process
under the judicial arbitrazh courts or to the process of arbitration in the CCI. 270
262. Zinger, supra note 6.
263. See Hendrix, supra note 11, at 10.
264. Alley, supra note 182; Franz van den Hoven, supra note 214; Arnold, supra note 38.
265. The failure to spend the time to draft a thoughtful arbitration clause seems to be the
cause of many problems that arise in the arbitration process: This is not the first case
with which I have had to deal where the arbitration clause has left something to be
desired. Many contract drafters seem to have difficulty in the fairly simple task of
drafting an arbitration clause or even replicating a standard form arbitration clause.
Arbitral institutions and associations go to the trouble of drafting standard form clauses
and disseminating them for the benefit of users, yet in far too high a percentage of
cases something goes wrong.
Fischer and Haydock, supra note 29, at 974 (quoting a judge in Lucky-Goldstar Int'l v. Ng Moo
Kee Eng'g Ltd., [1993] 2 HKLR 73).
266. Id. at 962.
267. Arnold, supra note 38, at 113.
268. "[I]t is prudent to cross reference the drafted clause with the rules to avoid redundancy, or even
worse, inconsistency, uncertainty, or inoperability.... These traits are the hallmarks of defective
international commercial arbitration clauses." Fischer and Haydock, supra note 29, at 968.
269. A.S. Komarov, International Commercial Arbitration in Russia as a Way of Settlement of
Foreign Trade Disputes, RGL/IPG LAW, Vol. 1, No. 5, 1994, at 28.
270. Russia Overhauls System, supra note 11, at 174.
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Thus, a clause that simply states that "disputes shall be considered by an arbitra-
tion court" will require an additional specification by the parties or there will
need to be a finding on what the parties' intent was.27' If the parties intend to
engage in traditional arbitration (ad hoc or institutional), they should explicitly
state such to avoid an interpretation that they intended their disputes to be litigated
in the Russian judicial arbitrazh courts.272
VII. Conclusion
Although there is not a clear-cut preference for a particular forum, what is
clear is that many costs, delays, and other negatives can be dealt with by under-
standing the problems facing Russian society and by drafting smart arbitration
clauses to ameliorate those problems. 273 Russia has made some substantial im-
provements in the area of international arbitration that make it increasingly more
sensible as an arbitration alternative given the right set of circumstances.274 In-
deed, for disputes involving Russian parties, with assets located in Russia, the
Arbitrazh Court or the ICAC may be preferable to arbitration in the SCC Institute
or the ICC.
In the short term, however, it appears that for the more complex international
commercial relationships having large sums of money at stake, parties may prefer
the SCC Institute or the ICC over the Russian Arbitrazh Courts and the CCI/
ICAC to ensure greater impartiality and quality of process. It remains to be seen
if either of the Russian alternatives will develop a higher level of expertise in
commercial disputes necessary to gain the trust of parties to engage in an impartial
resolution of complex, high-stake international commercial disputes.
271. Komarov, supra note 270.
272. Id.
273. See Nikiforov, supra note 6; Arnold, supra note 38; Hendrix, supra note 11.
274. See Keeva, supra note 5; Koman, supra note 5; Zinger, supra note 6.
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